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WHAT COGNITIVE DISSONANCE TELLS 
US ABOUT TONE IN PERSUASION 
 
Kathryn Stanchi* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the toughest questions that lawyers face is how hard to 
push in persuasion. We want to advocate strongly enough so that 
our passion for our client’s cause, and our belief in its rightness, is 
apparent to the court. There is nothing worse than lukewarm 
advocacy. But we do not want to push so far that we cross from 
zealous advocacy into obnoxiousness. The problem is that the line 
between persuasion and coercion is a fine one.  
This Article takes the first step in thinking about where good 
advocacy should draw the line between zeal and coercion.  Legal 
advocates differ about how to navigate that line.1 Is the best service 
to the client to be found in the most aggressive, strongest, hard-line 
approach? Or is a more tempered, reasonable approach most likely 
to produce the best results?   
This fundamental disagreement in advocacy philosophy is 
certainly not limited to law. In the words of Richard Perloff, a 
national expert in persuasion science: 
Many . . . view persuasion in John Wayne, macho 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. I would like to 
thank Marilyn Walter and Betsy Fajans for putting together such a wonderful 
symposium and inviting me to participate. Many thanks also to Linda Berger 
and Emily Zimmerman, who provided insightful comments on prior drafts, and 
Kevin Yoegel and Tam Tran, who provided excellent research assistance. 
 1 Compare Kathleen T. Browe, Comment, A Critique of the Civility 
Movement: Why Rambo Will Not Go Away, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 751 (1994), with 
Robert L. Haig & Robert S. Getman, Does Hardball Litigation Produce the Best 
Result for Your Client?, 65 N.Y. ST. B.J., no. 1, Jan. 1993, at 24–28, 64. See also 
Peter M. Appleton, Is Winning Everything?, 62 OR. ST. B. BULL., no. 6, Apr. 
2002, at 21–23. 
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terms. Persuaders are seen as tough-talking sales 
people, strongly stating their position, hitting people 
over the head with arguments, and pushing the deal 
to a close. But this oversimplifies matters. It 
assumes that persuasion is a boxing match, won by 
the fiercest competitor. In fact persuasion is 
different. It’s more like teaching than boxing. Think 
of a persuader as a teacher, moving people step by 
step to a solution, helping them appreciate why the 
advocated position solves the problem best.2 
On the other hand, well-known trial lawyer Gerry Spence has been 
quoted as saying that he goes “to court to do battle, not dance the 
minuet.”3 
This Article looks at cognitive science for guidance on this 
question. One cognitive process that seems to be integral to tone is 
cognitive dissonance, a concept I will explain in Part II. I then take 
a close look at two types of advocacy strategies that exemplify the 
conflict between the hardline and tempered approaches to 
advocacy. The first advocacy strategy, addressed in Part III, 
focuses on how to deal with arguments and information that 
undermine your position. Is it best to sound like you believe your 
case to be ideal and that contrary arguments are wholly without 
merit or even spurious? Or is it best to acknowledge that there are 
possible reasonable counterviews while still arguing that your 
position has greater merit?  
The second advocacy strategy, addressed in Part IV, is how to 
approach a controversial rule or premise for which you are 
advocating. Is the best approach to push early and hard in support 
of the rule, or to ease the reader into the controversial point by 
taking her through a step-by-step thought process that guides her to 
the controversial point? 
The bottom line is that in both rhetorical situations, cognitive 
dissonance supports an advocacy approach that, while still strong 
                                                          
2 RICHARD M. PERLOFF, THE DYNAMICS OF PERSUASION: COMMUNICATION 
AND ATTITUDES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 12 (Jennings Bryant et al. eds., 4th ed. 
2010). 
3 Haig & Getman, supra note 1, at 26 (citing David Margolick, At the Bar: 
Rambos Invade the Courtroom, and the Profession, Aghast, Fires Back with 
Etiquette, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1988, at B5). 
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in pursuit of a favorable outcome, appears more gradual, objective, 
and reasonable. In other words, it is often advisable for lawyers to 
present arguments in a way that appears to be reasonable, 
measured, and objective.  
Despite this conclusion, I do not take the position that a 
reasonable, measured approach to advocacy is always the best 
path. Nor do I suggest that lawyers should actually become 
educators rather than zealous advocates. There are undoubtedly 
occasions in which lawyers should push their positions 
aggressively.4 Decisions about tone may change given the context 
and the strengths of the merits of the case. The audience for the 
argument is also, of course, a consideration—whether it is a judge, 
a panel of judges, a court of last resort, or a jury.  
My proposal is a modest one: lawyers should learn what 
psychologists know about the typical reaction of human beings to 
aggressive argumentation. This Article is meant to be a first step in 
that endeavor and concludes that, in the circumstances described 
below, the most persuasive approach—the one most 
psychologically appealing to decision-makers—is one that appears 
more balanced and reasonable rather than one that is aggressively 
pushy and one-sided.  
 
I. COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 
 
Cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable psychological state 
that results when a person’s strong beliefs (or “cognitions”) clash.5 
                                                          
4 For example, it is sometimes important for lawyers to advance an 
argument that the judge has expressed displeasure with, or continue to object to 
a line of questioning, or the like, because it is the right thing to do for the client. 
At other times, it is appropriate to show outrage at a particular set of facts or a 
particular legal decision. I do not mean to suggest a bright line rule about tone—
that lawyers must always make their arguments in a measured tone. I argue only 
that, on balance, a reasonable tone often works better to persuade because of 
how people react to aggressive argumentation. 
5 See JOEL COOPER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: FIFTY YEARS OF A 
CLASSICAL THEORY 2–6 (2007) (explaining that dissonance is aroused when 
expectations are “discordant” with observations, which is an “uncomfortable, 
unpleasant state” that causes anxiety and agitation). See also ARTHUR ARON & 
ELAINE N. ARON, THE HEART OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: A BACKSTAGE VIEW OF 
A PASSIONATE SCIENCE 113–18 (2d ed. 1989); Elliot Aronson, Dissonance 
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For example, when a person who considers herself a philanthropist 
is asked for a donation and does not give, that is a scenario likely 
to arouse cognitive dissonance, because the person’s self-image (as 
a philanthropist) is clashing with reality (her failure to give 
money).6 Or, when a member of Mothers Against Drunk Driving 
(“MADD”) finds herself tipsy and with no way home but to drive 
her car. Cognitive dissonance can also arise when people’s 
expectations conflict with behavior or reality, such as when people 
expected the year 2000 to cause a massive technological disaster 
(the “Y2K problem”), but everything turned out to be fine.7 
The discomfort of cognitive dissonance arises because people 
generally do not like inconsistency.8 When we are confronted with 
conflicting thoughts, we become uncomfortable and will strive to 
resolve that discomfort.9 Dissonance also has a magnitude—the 
stronger the clash of beliefs, the more acute the feeling of 
                                                          
Theory: Progress and Problems, in THEORIES OF COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY 5, 5–
6 (Robert P. Abelson et al. eds., 1968). 
6 For more examples of cognitive dissonance, see PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 
236–38. 
7 PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 236; see also COOPER, supra note 5, at 2 
(giving other examples). Many readers will likely remember that prior to the 
year 2000, most computers represented the year using only the last two digits of 
the year—for example, 95 for 1995. In the time leading up to the year 2000, 
many predicted a massive computer failure because of the inability of computers 
to distinguish the year 2000 from 1900. This was called the Y2K problem (an 
acronym for “year 2000 problem”). Some thought that this failure would result 
in a financial crisis as well as the failures of infrastructure and utilities. People 
stockpiled food and water, avoided air travel, and withdrew their money from 
banks. See Frances Romero, Y2K, TIME (May 20, 2011), http://content.time.com 
/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2072678_2072683_2072599,00.html; 
Press Release, Decision Analyst, Americans Planning to Take Y2K Precautions 
(Nov. 19, 1999), available at http://decisionanalyst.com/publ_data/ 
1999/Y2K.dai. January 1, 2000, however, passed by with only minor glitches. 
See Y2K Bug Fails to Bite, BBC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/science/nature/ 
585013.stm. 
8 COOPER, supra note 5, at 2. 
9 See PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 238–40 (describing cognitive dissonance as 
an “amalgamation of physiological arousal, negative affect, and mental 
anguish”). 
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dissonance.10  
There are a number of ways that people resolve dissonance. In 
the hypothetical about the woman in MADD, the woman could 
change her behavior (resolve herself to sleeping in the car), change 
her belief (driving tipsy isn’t that bad), or rationalize (just this 
once . . . otherwise I’ll freeze out here).11 Cognitive dissonance 
creates the potential to change not only behavior, but also beliefs.12 
The reality is, however, that when confronted with cognitive 
dissonance, most people do not change their strongly held beliefs. 
Instead, most people rationalize.13 Even more interesting, 
sometimes when people are confronted with a situation or reality 
that clashes with their belief, their minds will alter that situation or 
reality to the extent possible to move it toward consistency with 
the belief.14 For example, those who firmly believed that the year 
2000 would cause a computer disaster might not have reacted to 
the reality of the uneventful passing of January 1, 2000 by 
sheepishly acknowledging that they overreacted. Rather, they 
might “alter reality” by insisting that the disaster had actually 
happened on January 1 but that the real consequences would be 
experienced in the years to come.15 
Cognitive dissonance is aroused in many advocacy situations, 
and that means that advocates can take advantage of knowledge 
about cognitive dissonance in a number of ways. There are 
situations in which it is advantageous to the advocate to arouse 
cognitive dissonance. In other situations, the best path is advocacy 
that helps to avoid or alleviate a decision-maker’s dissonance. In 
any event, it is critical for advocates to have a feel for: 1) which 
advocacy situations arouse dissonance; 2) whether the resolution of 
that dissonance is potentially advantageous; and 3) how to avoid 
                                                          
10 Id. at 239.  
11 For a list of possible ways to overcome dissonance, see id. at 240. 
12 Id. at 239. 
13 Id. at 241, 250 (“[H]uman beings are not rational animals, but, rather, 
rationalizing animals.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Aronson, supra note 5, at 6).  
14 People will “deny and distort reality, refusing to acknowledge they made 
a mistake.” Id. at 241. 
15 See id. at 236. Or, the believers in the Y2K disaster may also assert that 
no problems occurred because a small number of people were vigilant and 
solved the problems before they happened. 
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dissonance, if it would be more advantageous to do so. Those 
questions are addressed in the following sections. 
 
II. VOLUNTEERING BAD INFORMATION: SHOWING YOUR WARTS 
 
If you look at the briefs being filed in courts, you will see 
widely different rhetorical approaches to dealing with adverse 
information and counter-arguments. Some briefs are aggressive 
and hard line in arguing their position. These kinds of briefs 
eschew any shows of weakness, and, if weaknesses appear in them, 
the weaknesses are quickly and decisively batted away as 
irrelevant or without merit.16 These briefs would never be called 
“educational” or “informational.” They have a clear point of view 
that is unwavering.17 One judge described these kinds of briefs as 
“screaming” and “table pounding.”18 Clients often like this style of 
advocacy because it looks like they have someone truly on their 
                                                          
16 See Richard Gabriel, Professionalism in Today’s Competitive Legal 
Market, 39 COLO. LAW, no. 6, June 2010, at 65, 66 (noting that repeated use of 
words “frivolous” “groundless,” and “wholly without merit” are not persuasive). 
See generally Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Shooting from the Lip: United 
States v. Dickerson, Role [Im]morality, and the Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 1 (2000) (describing various disrespectful rhetorical techniques, 
including arguments put forth as though there is no reasonable counter-point). 
17 It is worth noting here that sometimes the aggressive approach is a 
deliberate rhetorical strategy. Other times, though, lawyers fall into a common 
trap of becoming so involved with the client and the client’s case that they quite 
literally cannot see weaknesses in their own cases. As a result, they write briefs 
in the aggressive style. One commentator refers to this inability to see beyond 
the strengths of the case as “myopic vision.” Kristin K. Robbins, Paradigm 
Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. 
REV. 483, 516–22 (2003) [hereinafter Robbins, Paradigm Lost]. This trap is 
quite common for legal advocates, in particular for those who represent a certain 
category of client over and over. See Jay M. Quam, Keys to Effective Advocacy: 
What I Wish I’d Known as a Litigator, 65 BENCH & B. MINN. 22, 23 (2008) 
(describing lawyers whose judgment about weak cases get clouded because they 
want to give the client what he wants).  
18 Gabriel, supra note 16, at 66–67. This style of advocacy is also 
sometimes called “Rambo” advocacy (as in just shoot everyone and everything) 
or “scorched earth” (as in drop the bomb and consequences be damned). Browe, 
supra note 1, at 755. 
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side.19  
Then there are briefs that adopt a more moderate tone. It is 
clear that these advocates still have an agenda and want to win, but 
the rhetoric is cloaked in an aura of objectivity.20 These briefs 
appear as though the advocate has thoughtfully considered both 
sides and has, upon deliberation, landed on the side favorable to 
the client. It is, of course, highly unlikely to have been the lawyer’s 
actual process of advocacy to weigh both sides objectively (at least 
once the lawyer determined that representation of the client was a 
good idea). Rather, it is a purposeful strategy that makes the 
argument more closely mimic the judge’s process of decision-
making.  
So what does the science tell us, if anything, about resolving 
this fundamental philosophical disagreement? At least part of the 
answer lies in cognitive dissonance. Many studies of persuasive 
messages, both within and outside the legal context, demonstrate 
that voluntarily disclosing harmful information makes a message 
more persuasive, as long as that harmful information is rebutted 
effectively by the advocate.21 In other words, you are better off 
acknowledging your flaws than ignoring them, and you should 
address why your message should be accepted despite those flaws. 
But in rebutting whatever counterarguments exist, the advocate 
should give the appearance of having honestly and objectively 
considered the other arguments. Glib rebuttals, or those that 
“scorch the earth,” should be avoided.22 
                                                          
19 Browe, supra note 1, at 774–75, 778–79 (clients may want Rambo style 
advocacy). 
20 These briefs often have numerous demonstrations of lawyer ethos—a 
label Aristotle put on an advocate’s reputation for intelligence, truthfulness, and 
other positive character traits. See MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL 
WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES FOR PERSUASIVE WRITING 127 (3d ed. 
2012) (defining ethos). 
21 See generally Kathryn Stanchi, Playing with Fire: The Science of 
Confronting Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 381 
(2008) [hereinafter Stanchi, Playing with Fire] and studies cited therein. 
22 Of course, whether to reveal a flaw in a persuasive argument depends on 
the interaction of a number of complex factors—among them how serious is the 
flaw, how likely is it to be raised by the other side, and is there a way to mitigate 
or address it. The advocate should consider all those factors. But on balance, if it 
is a close call or other factors are equal, the science militates in favor of 
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How does cognitive dissonance shed light on this question? 
The uncomfortable psychological state of cognitive dissonance 
arises both from advocacy that is too positive and acknowledges no 
flaws, as well as from advocacy that voluntarily discloses flaws. 
The details of how dissonance operates in both those scenarios are 
outlined in Section A. The key, though, is how the decision-maker 
resolves the dissonance. As the following sections indicate, the 
way decision-makers are likely to resolve dissonance cuts against 
one-sided advocacy and toward more reasonable acknowledgement 
of harmful information and counterarguments.  
 
A. Messages That “Protest Too Much” 
 
The lady doth protest too much, methinks.23 
 
In Shakespeare’s Hamlet, the quote above is spoken by 
Hamlet’s mother, Queen Gertrude, during a scene in Hamlet’s play 
in which the Player Queen vows her eternal love to her husband, 
the king, and swears never to remarry. Gertrude’s response 
indicates her opinion that the Player Queen’s vows are not worthy 
of belief because she has voiced them so insistently and without 
qualification.  
“Protesting too much” in legal advocacy can take many forms. 
One common form is the “too-perfect” argument that contains only 
positive information and does not acknowledge the existence of 
flaws. For example, a description of a client that makes the client 
appear to be “too good to be true” protests too much.24 Arguments 
that offer only supportive information and ignore any opposing 
arguments, so called “one-sided messages,” suffer from a similar 
problem.  
Another common argument that “protests too much” is one that 
addresses flaws or opposing arguments but does so in a flippant 
                                                          
disclosure and refutation. Id.  
23 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 2. 
24 As Ruth Anne Robbins notes, the statement of facts should be written 
with the client as the hero, and heroes always have flaws. See Ruth Anne 
Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story 
Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767, 775–76 (2006). 
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way, or a relentlessly aggressive way. This kind of argument 
nominally raises flaws, but often the flaws are “straw men” raised 
only so that they can be knocked down.25  
Although it can look like it is considering both sides, this kind 
of argument is actually one-sided. It does not have the appearance 
of having objectively considered reasonable opposing views; 
instead, all opposing views, even reasonable ones, are wholly 
rejected as ridiculous or without merit.  
One-sided messages like these protest too much. As a result, 
they can backfire by leading decision-makers to embrace the 
opposite of what the message advocates. The backfire results in 
part from the arousal of the message recipient’s cognitive 
dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is aroused by messages that 
“protest too much” because these messages will conflict with two 
strongly held beliefs: (1) no person or argument is perfect, and (2) 
all arguments have two sides.26 These strongly held and 
widespread beliefs spring from a common natural skepticism that 
things that appear “too good to be true”27 are not. The feelings of 
dissonance aroused by the conflict between the message that 
                                                          
25 T. EDWARD DAMER, ATTACKING FAULTY REASONING: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO FALLACY FREE ARGUMENTS 221 (7th ed. 2012). Damer describes a 
“straw man” argument as a weaker “caricature of an opponent’s argument that 
the faulty arguer substitutes” for the actual argument, for the sole purpose of 
knocking it down. The “straw man” is a fallacy because it does not rebut the 
actual opposing argument. Id. Although it is a fallacy, the “straw man” can be 
effective, because it distorts the opponent’s argument (making it seem less 
effective). 
26 Stanchi, Playing with Fire, supra note 21, at 397. 
27 See Joseph R. Priester et al., Whence Univalent Ambivalence? From the 
Anticipation of Conflicting Reactions, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 11, 12, 19–20 
(2007) (“[M]any people recognize that there are two sides to every story and 
that nothing is perfect (or completely worthless).”). See also Michael Burgoon et 
al., Revisiting the Theory of Psychological Reactance, in THE PERSUASION 
HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 213, 215–18 (Price 
Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002) (describing research that showed the 
audience may interpret a persuasive message that is too strong as a threat to 
freedom of choice and resist that message); Taeda Jovicic, The Effectiveness of 
Argument Strategies, 20 ARGUMENTATION 29, 47 (2006) (arguing that 
persuasive messages that are too strong “may stimulate a negative evaluation of 
the message, searching for information to confirm alternatives, and 
aggressiveness toward the persuader”).  
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“protests too much” and these strongly held beliefs can make the 
message recipient view the message as biased and overly pushy. 
Concluding that there is something wrong with the message 
resolves the dissonance and allows the reader to cling to her 
strongly held beliefs.28 Once a message recipient’s cognitive 
dissonance leads her to believe that the message is flawed (by bias 
or coercive tactics), the message recipient is likely to reject the 
message.29 
Because of these strongly held beliefs, when people hear a 
client described in an unrealistically positive way, or hear an 
argument that seems improbably airtight, they assume there must 
be something wrong.30 That feeling that “something is wrong” is 
cognitive dissonance. In messages that protest too much, the belief 
that nothing is perfect clashes with the reality of a persuasive 
message that seems to be perfect. The magnitude of dissonance felt 
will increase with the one-sidedness of the message—the more 
                                                          
28 See Russell A. Jones & Jack W. Brehm, Persuasiveness of One- and 
Two-Sided Communications as a Function of Awareness There Are Two Sides, 6 
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 47, 55 (1970) (concluding that reduced 
effectiveness of one-sided communications is attributed to audience perception 
that such messages are biased and are exerting pressure). 
29 An excellent example of this phenomenon appears in Bennett v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., No. 13-3047, 2013 WL 5312398 (6th 
Cir. Sept. 24, 2013). In this case, defendant State Farm had derided one of 
plaintiff’s arguments as “ridiculous.” The court had this to say:  “There are good 
reasons not to call an opponent’s argument “ridiculous,” which is what State 
Farm calls Barbara Bennett’s principal argument here. The reasons include 
civility; the near-certainty that overstatement will only push the reader away 
(especially when, as here, the hyperbole begins on page one of the brief); and 
that, even where the record supports an extreme modifier, “the better practice is 
usually to lay out the facts and let the court reach its own conclusions.” But here 
the biggest reason is more simple: the argument that State Farm derides as 
ridiculous is instead correct.” Id. at *1. Interestingly, at least one experienced 
insurance lawyer who read this believed that State Farm’s argument had 
substantive merit, which means that a good argument was rejected in this case 
because of overly aggressive tone. See E-mail from Elizabeth Shaver to author 
(October 23, 2013) (on file with author). 
30 See Jerold L. Hale et al., Cognitive Processing of One- and Two-Sided 
Persuasive Messages, 55 W.J. SPEECH COMM. 380, 387 (1991); Priester et al., 
supra note 27, at 19–20 (noting when confronted by a message that puts forth 
only “pros” or “cons,” people will feel conflicted and ambivalent). 
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biased the message, and the more aggressively it is pushed, the 
more dissonance a decision-maker will feel.  
When confronted with a clash between a strong belief that 
there are two sides to every story and the reality of a one-sided 
story, there are a few likely results, which are discussed below. 
None of these likely results favor the advocate who advances the 
“too-perfect” argument.31 People will go to great lengths to avoid 
changing or discarding strongly held beliefs. Rather, like the 
people who continued to insist after January 1, 2000 that the year 
2000 would bring disaster, most people will “change” reality to fit 
their strongly held beliefs.  
 
1. The “Too-perfect” Message Arouses Dissonance That 
Encourages the Audience to Look for Flaws 
 
One response people can have to the dissonance created by a 
“too-perfect” message is to look closely for flaws. For many 
people, finding a flaw will ease the dissonance. Thus, if an 
advocate presents his client as perfect, the reader may wonder 
whether there is information missing and may search for failings or 
weaknesses.32 In the same way, if an advocate presents only 
                                                          
31 The only option that does favor the advocate of a “too-perfect” 
message—changing or modifying the belief that no person or argument is 
perfect—is unlikely. See COOPER, supra note 5, at 4–5. In general, it is difficult 
to change a strongly held belief. Id. at 8. In his book, Cooper tells a story of a 
religious group that had predicted and anticipated the end of the world on a 
particular date. When the world did not end at the appointed time, the magnitude 
of the cognitive dissonance of the religious followers was enormous. But, in the 
end, they did not resolve that dissonance by concluding that they were simply 
wrong. Instead, they believed that their faith had stopped the end of the world. 
Id. at 4–5. 
32 See Priester et al., supra note 27, at 19–20 (the absence of contrary 
information makes people concerned that contrary information exists). See also 
Jovicic, supra note 27, at 47 (noting that persuasive messages can stimulate a 
message recipient to search for alternatives to the message); Derek D. Rucker et 
al., What’s in a Frame Anyway?: A Meta-Cognitive Analysis of the Impact of 
One Versus Two Sided Message Framing on Attitude Certainty, 18 J. 
CONSUMER. PSYCHOL. 137, 138 (2008) (“[W]hen a message presents only one-
sided attributes (positive or negative), people sometimes assume that there are 
opposite attributes of which they are unaware . . . . [W]hen a source indicates 
that negatives have been considered, concern over possible missing information 
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positive arguments, the reader will scrutinize the arguments for 
holes in a way that she would not if the message were more 
balanced.33 In the legal context, while the reader searching for 
flaws might not find any in the one-sided argument, she is likely to 
find them elsewhere: the other side’s arguments, or by independent 
research (for example, by a judicial clerk). So, the advocate 
advancing a “too-perfect” argument has already created problems 
for himself because he has aroused people’s natural skepticism and 
motivated them to find evidence to support their skepticism.34  
But things may get even worse once the evidence of a flaw is 
found—and it almost always will be, because, of course, most 
things are not perfect. Once a reader finds the flaw he has been 
seeking, he may feel a surge of relief and satisfaction at the release 
of the dissonance and the confirmation of the strongly held belief 
that things are not perfect.35 In most scenarios, where things are 
not presented as “perfect,” people expect flaws and may react to a 
flaw with indifference or mild interest. But to someone seeking a 
flaw in a “too-perfect” argument, finding that flaw is validating 
and satisfying. It creates the feeling of “Aha! I knew it!”36 The 
feeling of having cognitive dissonance resolved by confirmation of 
a strongly held belief makes a reader who feels this sense of 
achievement unlikely to casually dismiss the flaw or overlook it. 
Instead, she is going to feel a keen interest in it.37  
                                                          
can be put aside . . . .”).  
33 See sources cited supra note 27. See generally JAMES B. STIFF & PAUL A. 
MONGEAU, PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION 142–43 (2d ed. 2003) (“[M]essage 
sources gain a persuasive advantage by making their arguments as complete as 
is possible.”).  
34 See Stanchi, Playing with Fire, supra note 21, at 404 (noting the natural 
skepticism in response to one-sided messages). 
35 See Jovicic, supra note 27, at 46–47. Psychologists refer to this as 
“restoration” because the feelings of conflict and dissonance are resolved and a 
satisfying stasis is restored. Id. at 46. Restoration makes people feel good about 
the “attractiveness of alternatives to the persuasive message.” Id. at 47. 
36 Think about how common it is for many people to feel satisfaction when 
they hear that some fabulous celebrity got divorced or was arrested. That feeling 
is similar to what happens when a flaw is revealed to someone who is 
experiencing the cognitive dissonance of a “too-perfect” persuasive message. 
37 Confirmation bias is also certainly at work in this cognitive process. 
Confirmation bias makes people favor information that confirms their beliefs 
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Another outcome, equally unfavorable to the advocate pressing 
the “too-perfect” message, is that the reader will attempt to resolve 
the cognitive dissonance by assuming that the argument, or client, 
has flaws but that, for some reason, the advocate has not disclosed 
them. The reader may then conclude that the advocate is not aware 
of the flaws because he is not fully informed about the issues or the 
case. Once the reader concludes that the advocate is not 
knowledgeable, he is likely to reject the advocate’s other 
arguments as the product of incomplete information or knowledge. 
This is called the “discounting hypothesis” because the audience 
discounts the advocate’s message based on its assessment of the 
credibility of the advocate herself.38 
On the other hand, the recipient of the “too-perfect” persuasive 
message may conclude that the absence of flaws in the argument 
means that the advocate is deliberately withholding information 
from her. That will lead her to conclude that the advocate is not 
credible or honest.39 And once a subject has decided not to trust the 
advocate, she will be less likely to accept a message from that 
source. That response to dissonance is called “reactance” and it can 
cause a subject to reject an entire message.40 It is a kind of “baby 
                                                          
and hypotheses. See Margit Oswold & Stephan Grosjean, Confirmation Bias, in 
COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING 
79, 79 (Rudiger F. Pohl ed., 2012). Among other effects of confirmation bias is 
the tendency to selectively notice or remember certain evidence or interpret 
ambiguous evidence in a biased way. Id.; see also Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric 
J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Beliefs and 
Values, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES 120, 133 (2002). 
38 See Mike Allen, Meta-Analysis Comparing the Persuasiveness of One-
Sided and Two-Sided Messages, 55 W.J. SPEECH COMM. 390, 392, 398 (1991) 
(finding support for discounting hypothesis in study of two sided messages). 
Because people assume that most arguments have two sides—that there is no 
perfect argument—they may conclude that the source of a one-sided message 
simply does not know enough about the topic to know all of the pros and cons. 
See also SMITH, supra note 20, at 149 (noting that the more an advocate can 
establish herself as a capable and intelligent source of information, the more the 
audience will give her arguments credibility). 
39 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
40 See SHARON S. BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 1–4 (1981) (finding that an 
attempt to persuade can be a threat to decision-making freedom). See also Jones 
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out with the bathwater” reaction, because the whole message can 
suffer once reactance has been aroused.41 Reactance will be 
explored more deeply in the next section. 
 
2. The Cognitive Dissonance Aroused by the “Too-perfect” 
Message Can Lead the Audience to Reject the Message 
 
Legal persuasion can be seen, in many ways, as a social 
situation between the advocate and the decision-maker. The 
advocate and decision-maker have tacitly agreed to engage in a 
process in which the advocate can try to convince the decision-
maker of some fact or theory, and the decision-maker will listen 
and be receptive to the arguments and render an unbiased 
decision.42 This agreement between advocate and decision-maker, 
like most social situations, has unwritten social norms. One of 
those social norms is that the advocate will not try to persuade by 
deception. If a decision-maker resolves cognitive dissonance by 
concluding that the advocate has purposefully withheld 
information, the decision-maker may feel that the advocate has 
violated the norms of the persuasive social situation.43 When a 
                                                          
& Brehm, supra note 28, at 55 (noting that overt, strong persuasion can be 
perceived as exerting pressure).  
41 Jones & Brehm, supra note 28, at 49. This study noted that a message 
that pressures a person to adopt a particular position threatens that person’s 
decisional freedom, and the person will try to restore the threatened freedom by 
rejecting the message. Id. Messages that address only positive or supporting 
arguments are more likely to lead to reactance, because they represent a greater 
threat to decisional freedom. Id. at 49, 55. See also Jovicic, supra note 27, at 47 
(“[Reactance] stimulate[s] negative evaluation of the message, searching for 
information to confirm the alternatives, and aggressiveness toward the 
persuader.”). 
42 See generally FRANS VAN EEMEREN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF 
ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND 
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1996). See also Jovicic, supra note 27, at 31. 
Jovicic summarizes a group of argumentation theorists, including the 
Amsterdam school, the formal dialectics, the Woods-Walton and the Walton 
approach as all agreeing that argument is a social, dialogic activity. Id. at 31–32; 
see also DOUGLAS WALTON, ONE SIDED ARGUMENTS: A DIALECTICAL 
ANALYSIS OF BIAS 29–32 (1999) (persuasion as a dialogue with a collective 
goal). 
43 See FRANS VAN EEMEREN ET AL., FALLACIES AND JUDGMENTS OF 
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decision-maker resolves cognitive dissonance by concluding that 
the advocate has purposefully withheld information, the advocate’s 
“too-perfect” message can lead to what is called “reactance.” 
Reactance (sometimes called a “boomerang” reaction) is a 
backlash against a persuasive message in which decision-makers 
reject the entire message, not because of the merits of that 
message, but because they oppose the feeling of being controlled.44 
When a persuasive message is “too-perfect” or when it pushes too 
hard in its tone, as when the rebuttal of opposing arguments is too 
strident or contentious, the decision-maker may feel manipulated 
or controlled. And the feeling of being manipulated can arouse all 
kinds of negative feelings, including anger and betrayal. Decision-
makers may feel like the advocate has threatened their decision-
making autonomy.45 The line between persuasion and coercion has 
been crossed and the social norm broken. Reactance is a typical 
response to these kinds of feelings. And, it is not a good response 
for the advocate. Reactance means the decision-maker is 
emotionally motivated to reject the message and is likely to do 
so.46   
                                                          
REASONABLENESS: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH CONCERNING THE PRAGMA-
DIALECTIC DISCUSSION RULES 203–20 (2009) [hereinafter EEMEREN ET AL., 
FALLACIES AND JUDGMENTS] (discussing how fallacies are “violations of the 
rules of critical discussions”); see also Jovicic, supra note 27, 32–33 (describing 
strategic maneuvering in which parties to an argument agree on “norms, rules 
and stages of argument”). 
44 Id.; Burgoon et al., supra note 27, at 214. See also EEMEREN ET AL., 
FALLACIES AND JUDGMENTS, supra note 43, at 144–45 (describing how 
censoring or redacting arguments results in movement of belief toward the 
censored argument); Mark V. A. Howard et al., How Processing Resources 
Shape the Influence of Stealing Thunder on Mock-Juror Verdicts, 13 
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 60, 65 (2006). 
45 See BREHM & BREHM, supra note 40, at 1–2, 20–21, 25; Jones & Brehm, 
supra note 28, at 48, 55. Reactance theory “assumes that individuals believe 
they have specific behavioral freedoms and proposes that if a freedom is 
threatened, the motive to reassert the freedom will be aroused.” Id. at 25. When 
decisional or behavioral freedom is threatened, the person is likely to oppose the 
threat, even sometimes if that means acting against self-interest, or acting 
against other strongly held beliefs. Id. at 1 (telling the story of a shop owner 
who, though sympathetic to the message of civil rights demonstrators, closed his 
shop rather than give in to their demands). 
46 Once a decision-maker is motivated to reject the message, she will likely 
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Even if the decision-maker does not feel that the “too-perfect” 
message was intentionally deceptive, she may still feel that the 
advocate is trying to bias her decision. In this scenario, even if she 
isn’t angry, the decision-maker will no longer feel the need to 
abide by the norms of the persuasive situation because the 
advocate has already broken them. Recall that in the social 
situation of persuasion, the decision-maker’s “agreement” is to 
listen, be receptive, and render an objective judgment on the 
merits. If the decision-maker concludes that an advocate has 
withheld information, the decision-maker may (subconsciously) 
feel released from these obligations. A decision-maker who is 
psychologically freed from the obligation to listen and assess the 
merits of an argument is one who can more easily reject a 
persuasive message.  
Thus, a “too-perfect” or too-strident message, whether the 
decision-maker concludes it is intentionally deceptive or just an 
advocate’s idealization of the case, can lead to reactance and to a 
rejection of the advocate’s message, regardless of the merits.  
Professor Jim Stratman provides an example of reactance in his 
think aloud study of clerks who read an appellant’s brief that was a 
strident attack on the judicial opinion from which it was 
appealing.47 In this study, Professor Stratman had the appellant’s 
attorney record his thoughts while drafting a brief, and had the 
judge’s clerks record their thoughts while reading that brief.48 In 
one of his recordings, the appellant’s attorney describes his 
strategy to attack virtually every aspect of the adverse decision 
below. His brief does seem to address counterarguments, but does 
so in a way that is simultaneously superficial, aggressive, and 
somewhat contemptuous. The advocate has fallen into one of the 
kinds of “too protesting” arguments. This is an excerpt from the 
                                                          
look for reasons to support her judgment against the message of the offending 
advocate. See generally Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and its Rational 
Tail, 108 PSYCH. REV. 814 (2001) (people make decisions by intuition and 
emotion, and then use logic to generate reasons for the emotional decision). The 
Bennett v. State Farm case referenced supra note 29 is an example of reactance. 
47 James F. Stratman, Investigating Persuasive Processes in Legal 
Discourse in Real Time: Cognitive Biases and Rhetorical Strategy in Appeal 
Court Briefs, 17 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 1, 44, 46–47 (1994).  
48 Id. at 18–23. 
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appellant lawyer’s recorded thoughts: 
I think I will make, yes, the attack on the lower 
court opinion, 
[I] can attack its failure to deal with Philadelphia 
Eagles and Barsky, 
I can attack its reliance on Meta v. Yellow Cab [all 
cases cited by the lower court], 
I can attack its reliance on the right to jury trial 
cases, 
I can attack its failure to address Conestoga Bank, 
and I can attack . . . .49 
While, of course, it is an appellant’s job to find fault with the 
opinion below, the advocate here may have become too caught up 
in “attacking” and framed his argument using rhetoric that was too 
“uncompromising.”50 First, the tone of the brief was harshly 
negative about the opinion below.51 And, second, the advocate 
attacked almost every aspect of the court’s decision, from the 
smallest point to the largest, and did so with an unwavering 
stridency.52 This is a common advocacy problem, in which the 
lawyer, overcome with zeal for his client’s cause (or anger at 
opposing counsel), cannot separate trivial (or even imagined) 
wrongs from serious ones.53  
                                                          
49 Id. at 35 (emphasis added). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. (noting that the advocate’s zeal might have pushed his rhetoric from 
“righteous indignation” to “ridicule”). 
52 Id. at 35–36. As Professor Stratman puts it, the advocate’s zeal leads him 
to “attack shadows as well as substance.” Id.  
53 See Robbins, Paradigm Lost, supra note 17, at 516–23. This is an 
example of “myopic vision” noted above. See supra note 17 and accompanying 
text. The advocate’s zeal has effectively blinded her to any strength or merit in 
the other side’s argument. An example of this is when lawyers bring up some 
unprofessional behavior of opposing counsel, or trivial discovery disputes, in 
merits briefs. This is more common than it should be and likely to get a stinging 
response from a judge. See Judith D. Fischer, Incivility in Lawyers’ Writing: 
Judicial Handling of Rambo Run Amok, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 365, 372–74 (2011) 
(providing examples of discipline for incivility to opposing counsel); Fajans & 
Falk, supra note 16, at 43–44 (criticizing a litigant’s “peevish ad hominem 
attacks” against an opposing party). See also Robert Sayler, Rambo Litigation: 
Why Hardball Tactics Don’t Work, 74 A.B.A. J., no. 3, Mar. 1998, at 79, 81 
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The clerks in Professor Stratman’s study had a classic 
reactance response to the “protesting” quality of appellant’s brief. 
The strength of the appellant’s attack interrupted the flow of their 
reading and evaluation of the merits and the clerks bristled at the 
tone. Instead of focusing on the substance of the arguments, the 
clerks instead focused on the lawyer and his tactics. Ultimately the 
rhetoric made them recoil and they rejected the argument.  
For example, when one clerk reads the portion of the 
appellant’s brief that hammered away at a small, and relatively 
inconsequential, point in the court’s opinion below, the clerk notes: 
I didn’t see [the court] assuming that— 
That’s not really being fair to the Commonwealth 
Court— 
I didn’t read that the Commonwealth Court opinion 
even suggests that . . . 
This is the typical mode of argument where you set 
up a straw man and then knock it down.54 
The “straw man” comment, in particular, shows that the clerk 
felt that the advocate was trying to mislead or dupe her, and she 
reacts with the anger typical of a reactance response.55 Ultimately, 
this response does not serve the appellant well, as the clerks reject 
his argument largely on the basis of tone as opposed to substantive 
merit.56 
In addition to reactance, people can have another common 
response to a violation of the social norms of persuasion. If a 
decision-maker feels that the persuasive message is biased, or that 
their decision-making autonomy has been otherwise corrupted or 
manipulated, she might “over-correct.”   
Over-correction occurs when a decision-maker feels that an 
advocate or another factor has caused her decision-making process 
to become biased.57 As with reactance, the decision-maker has 
become distracted from the merits of the argument and has been 
                                                          
(likening hardball litigators to General Custer, who famously fired off “in every 
direction”). 
54 Stratman, supra note 47, at 39. 
55 Id. at 42. 
56 See id. at 44–46. 
57 See Richard E. Petty et al., Flexible Correction Processes in Social 
Judgment: Implication for Persuasion, 16 SOC. COGNITION 93, 96–97 (1998). 
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made acutely conscious of the persuasive situation. Like the clerks 
in Stratman’s study, the decision-maker is now not thinking about 
the merits of the case but instead about the manipulation of the 
persuasive context. When this happens, the advocate has lost the 
attention and good will of the decision-maker.  
But while reactance can cause decision-makers to reject the 
message outright, over-correction is often a little more subtle. With 
over-correction, the decision-maker has identified some factor or 
piece of evidence that she feels has unfairly influenced her 
decision-making process. She may then try to “put her finger on 
the scale” and correct for the perceived bias.58  
The problem is that people are rarely accurate in their 
assessment of what an “unbiased” decision would be.59 
Commonly, people “over-correct” for bias, meaning they swing the 
pendulum far away from the decision they perceive as unfairly 
biased. Therefore, in trying to make a balanced decision, they end 
up making a decision counter to the message of the advocate who 
has introduced the biasing factor.60 The important psychological 
point is that over-correction does not lead to unbiased decisions; it 
leads decision-makers to feel as though they have made unbiased 
decisions (relieving their cognitive dissonance). So, if an 
advocate’s tone or rhetoric makes a decision-maker feel that she is 
being unfairly influenced or biased, the advocate may have 
actually moved the decision-maker toward a decision for the other 
side. And the greater the perceived bias, the more vigilant the 
                                                          
58 See Durairaj Maheswaran & Shelly Chaiken, Promoting Systematic 
Processing in Low Motivation Settings: Effect of Incongruent Information on 
Processing and Judgment, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 13, 24 (1991).  
59 Duane T. Wegener & Richard E. Petty, The Flexible Correction Model: 
The Role of Naïve Theories of Bias in Bias Correction, in 29 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 141, 143 (1997). Psychologists note that, 
on balance, people are pretty incompetent to correct for perceived bias and use 
“naïve theories” of bias to judge bias in persuasive messages. Id. at 143, 149–51.  
60 See id. at 143, 146, 151–52. Although sometimes attempts at correction 
can result in a decision in favor of the persuasive message, this is unlikely if 
reactance has been aroused. The more likely decision is one that rejects the 
message. Id. See generally MEDIA EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND 
RESEARCH (Jennings Bryant & Mary Beth Oliver eds., 3d ed. 2009) (reactance 
motivates counter-arguing and leads to a judgment against the message that 
stimulates the reactance). 
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decision-maker will be in her pursuit of correction.61 
In one study in the trial context, for example, psychologists 
tested whether mock jurors would over-correct if key witness 
testimony was discredited.62 The study involved a simple dog bite 
case in which plaintiff suffered a bite from a German Shepherd. 
The main issue for jurors was whether the dog belonged to 
defendant.63 In the control version, mock jurors heard testimony 
both for and against each party; the case was designed to be 
close.64 In one experimental version, jurors heard an additional 
pro-plaintiff eyewitness who testified that the dog belonged to the 
defendant.65 The experimental eyewitness testimony was designed 
to clearly sway the case in the plaintiff’s favor. The pro-plaintiff 
eyewitness testified vehemently in favor of the plaintiff and 
phrased her testimony in an accusatory manner.66 The catch was 
that the pro-plaintiff eyewitness was later seriously discredited on 
cross-examination, and she recanted her testimony.67 Jurors were 
then told to disregard her testimony. 
The study shows that the testimony of the accusatory pro-
plaintiff witness, who is later discredited, pushed jurors to more 
often find for the defendant. Mock jurors who heard the discredited 
and accusatory pro-plaintiff eyewitness found for the defendant in 
significantly greater numbers than the control jurors.68 By 
testifying confidently and accusingly for the plaintiff and then 
being discredited, the pro-plaintiff witness made it more likely that 
defendant would win.69 The mock jurors believed that they had 
been biased by the false eyewitness testimony, and they over-
corrected by finding for the defendant.70  
                                                          
61 See Wegener & Petty, supra note 59, at 149. 
62 Nina Hatvany & Fritz Strack, The Impact of a Discredited Key Witness, 
10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 490, 494 (1980). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 494–95. There is another experimental version where the 
eyewitness testified in favor of the defendant. Id. at 495. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 494–95. 
68 Id. at 501.  
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 504. 
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This study illustrates that when decision-makers feel as though 
they have been biased by an argument, or their objectivity has been 
compromised, whether it is strident testimony or an argument that 
“protests too much,” the decision-maker may react by fighting 
against the argument and over-correcting against the perceived 
bias.71 The result is a decision against the strident or protesting 
advocate. 
 
B. The Lesson About Acknowledging Flaws: There is Real 
Power in Showing Vulnerability 
 
Pushing your perspective too stridently in a persuasive 
situation leads to cognitive dissonance, and that dissonance can 
lead a decision-maker to reject the message out of hand. But 
cognitive dissonance causes another wrinkle in the question of 
whether to disclose flaws. Studies have shown that, paradoxically, 
an advocate who does acknowledge counter-arguments, or who 
volunteers information that seems to damage her case, is also 
likely to arouse cognitive dissonance in the decision-maker. As in 
the “too-perfect” message, the cognitive dissonance reaction here 
has to do with the decision-maker’s expectations. For example, 
most people do not expect a first date to voluntarily blurt out faults 
(“Actually, I don’t have a source of income—can you get the 
check?”); rather, we expect a person on a first date to put his very 
best foot forward. If a flaw is disclosed on a first date, people are 
surprised and may experience cognitive dissonance. 
Advocacy situations can work similarly. In situations in which 
people expect advocacy, such as trials or other legal advocacy 
situations (and first dates), people may not expect an advocate to 
voluntarily raise flaws, even if they believe that all arguments have 
two sides.72 Therefore, if an advocate freely discloses bad 
                                                          
71 Of course, there are other possible reactions. Over-correction to bias can 
be tricky because a person can overthink and ping back and forth between 
biasing one side or the other. What the science, shows, however, is that the 
advocate who pushes too hard runs a real and significant risk that his argument 
will actually push the audience away from his message. 
72 Kipling D. Williams & Lara Dolnik, Revealing the Worst First: Stealing 
Thunder as a Social Influence Strategy, in SOCIAL INFLUENCE: DIRECT AND 
INDIRECT INFLUENCES 213, 216 (Joseph P. Forgas & Kipling D. Williams eds., 
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information, that may arouse dissonance. The clash in this scenario 
is between the expectation that advocates are only supposed to 
offer information beneficial to their side, and the reality that an 
advocate is openly admitting harmful information. 
It may seem here that persuasion scientists have contradicted 
themselves. Do people expect experts to raise both sides of an 
argument, or do they expect experts to present only a rosy picture? 
The answer is we don’t really know: it depends on context. Recall 
how Dr. Perloff described persuasion as more like teaching than 
boxing.73 That may be true, but advocacy is really a spectrum. 
Sometimes people can tolerate or even expect pushier advocacy—
think about car salesmen, or pitchpersons trying to sell things on 
infomercials. Most people do not expect car salesmen or hawkers 
on infomercials to detail the flaws of a car or product. In other 
situations, though, people expect advocates to be more like 
teachers—objective and educational, similar to experts on a talk or 
news show, or expert witnesses. If we think of persuasion 
scenarios on a spectrum between teaching and boxing, then where 
the advocate and scenario fall on the spectrum influences the 
audience’s expectations.74 And our expectations are the key to 
cognitive dissonance. Not surprisingly, studies show that people 
have far different expectations of advocates who are advertisers or 
salespeople than they do of advocates who are experts trying to 
educate us.75 Both advocates are trying to persuade us of 
something, but we expect different behavior from them. 
Where on the spectrum do legal advocates fit? Are we more 
like car salesmen or more like experts interviewed on a news 
program? It is not easy to say, but we are a little of both. While 
some judges, for example, may have a strong expectation (or 
desire) that advocates disclose both sides,76 lay juries may expect 
                                                          
2001).  
73 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
74 See PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 13–14.  
75 See Daniel O’Keefe, How to Handle Opposing Arguments in Persuasive 
Messages: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of One-Sided and Two-Sided 
Messages, 22 COMM. Y.B. 209, 226–27 (1999) (noting that expectations differ 
as between political and social messages, such as anti-smoking campaigns, and 
pure advertising). 
76 See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS 
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us to be one-sided “hired guns.” For my purposes here, the 
important point is that regardless of how people view legal 
advocates, cognitive dissonance works in favor of the advocate 
who discloses flaws. I have already discussed why cognitive 
dissonance favors disclosure of flaws if the decision-maker expects 
to hear both sides. But, it also favors disclosure of flaws if the 
decision-maker does not expect a lawyer to disclose.  
As noted above, when human beings experience dissonance, 
they are highly driven to resolve it.77 Reactance and over-
correction are just two possible reactions. Our brains will do 
whatever is needed to alleviate this uncomfortable psychological 
state. When a person experiences dissonance because of the 
incongruity of hearing a flaw in the advocate’s own position from 
an advocacy source that he expects to be biased, the person can 
actually feel protective of the message.78 In other words, people 
may resolve the cognitive dissonance—which is created by the 
apparently counter-productive act of disclosing harmful 
information—by mentally fighting against the harmful 
information.79 The decision-maker may try to figure out why a 
biased source is providing her with information that seems bad. 
Unlike the scenario described above, the decision-maker does not 
feel coerced or manipulated, but she may feel confused. Her 
cultural expectations have been contradicted. This cognitive 
dissonance reaction is stronger, of course, to the extent that the 
person agrees with the message, but the reaction can also arise in 
                                                          
AND ORAL ADVOCACY 25–26 (2d ed. 2003) (criticizing briefs that fail to 
mention adverse authority and arguments). 
77 Indeed, this is the key to cognitive dissonance theory—that it is not 
simply that we prefer messages that are two sided to those that are one-sided; it 
is that one-sided arguments arouse in us an uncomfortable state that we are 
driven to resolve. See PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 3.  
78 Raising flaws or counterarguments in a persuasive message can arouse 
feelings of “threat” in the message recipient. This feeling can lead the message 
recipient to try to “protect” the message by mentally generating arguments that 
undercut the flaw. See STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 33, at 289–90 (noting, 
however, that “threat” works largely for messages and arguments with which a 
person agrees; it is less effective for arguments with which the audience does 
not agree); Stanchi, Playing with Fire, supra note 21, at 406–07 (discussing why 
inoculation works). 
79 See PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 240–41. 
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decision-makers who are undecided.80 
One possible reaction to this kind of dissonance is that 
decision-makers will be driven to develop arguments that dispute 
or undermine the harmful information.81 In this scenario, the 
introduction of bad information functions like a vaccine-introduced 
virus.82 Our body will fight a vaccine-introduced virus, making us 
immune to an attack by that virus. Similarly, our minds can fight 
the introduction of harmful information from an unexpected source 
by attacking the harmful information with our own 
counterarguments.83 This process of counterargument has an 
interesting vaccination-like effect on our decision-making. It 
makes a persuasive message resistant to negative attacks by the 
other side.84  
Another related reaction to this dissonance is that the decision-
maker may mentally change the bad information to be less 
harmful. Like the person who insists after January 1, 2000 that the 
computer disaster will still happen, the decision-maker will 
mentally alter “reality” by making the bad information less “bad.” 
This resolves her dissonance, because if the information is not 
really “bad,” the advocate’s disclosure of it is consistent with the 
decision-maker’s belief that advocates do not disclose flaws. 
Psychologists call this cognitive process “change of meaning.”85  
                                                          
80 See STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 33, at 289. See also Michael Pfau et 
al., Efficacy of Inoculation Strategies in Promoting Resistance to Political 
Attack Messages, 57 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 25 (1990) (inoculation strategy in 
political advertisements worked best with strong party identifiers; also worked 
with others, but less consistently). 
81 See STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 33, at 289; see also PERLOFF, supra 
note 2, at 240–41; Pfau et al., supra note 80, at 29. 
82 See William J. McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion: Some 
Contemporary Approaches, in 1 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOLOGY 191 (1964) (discussing the original inoculation experiment).  
83 See id.; see also STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 33, at 298. 
84 This has led researchers to liken voluntary disclosure of negative 
information to medical immunization because it appears that disclosing negative 
information within a persuasive message can actually “inoculate” the message 
from future attacks. See McGuire, supra note 82, at 193. 
85 Lara Dolnik et al., Stealing Thunder as Courtroom Tactic Revisited: 
Processes and Boundaries, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 267, 269 (2003); see also 
S.E. Asch, The Doctrine Of Suggestion, Prestige, And Imitation In Social 
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Consider an example in which you’ve paid a considerable sum 
of money to see a show. The show turns out to be disappointing.86 
Any number of “changes of meaning” can occur here, some overt, 
some subtle. You can convince yourself that the show was actually 
pretty good. Or, more subtly, you can “add consonant 
cognitions”—you can tell yourself that it was worth seeing the 
show because one of the actors was very good, or that the set 
design was excellent.87 One of the most interesting aspects of this 
cognitive process is that the decision-maker is an active participant 
in the persuasion—because of the dissonance she feels, she 
participates in persuading herself.88  
In one key study of “change of meaning” in the legal context, 
message recipients were surveyed to determine their reactions to a 
trial strategy that voluntarily disclosed bad information, and one 
that waited for the other side to disclose.89 In the study, subjects 
read a trial transcript of a criminal trial involving a car accident in 
which one driver died.90 The other driver escaped with only minor 
injuries. The driver with minor injuries is charged with vehicular 
homicide. The prosecution’s theory is that the defendant was 
driving recklessly. The defendant’s theory is that the other driver 
died due to the negligence of the ambulance crew that responded to 
the accident. Researchers tested several different pieces of bad 
information: evidence that the defendant had been drinking before 
the accident, evidence that the defendant was speeding, and 
forensic evidence that the defendant had veered into the other 
lane.91  
                                                          
Psychology, 55 PSYCHOL. REV. 268–69 (1948) (decision-makers changed 
meaning of phrase “peaceful revolution” depending on who they thought source 
of statement was); Kiva Zunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 495 (1990) (a decision-maker’s motivation can change her 
reasoning, her process of deciding, and her evaluation of evidence).  
86 This example is adapted from PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 240. 
87 See PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 240. 
88 Id. at 13–14 (“One of the great myths of persuasion is that persuaders 
convince us to do things we really don’t want to do . . . . This overlooks an 
important point: People persuade themselves . . . [advocates] provide the 
arguments. They set up the bait. [But] we make the change, or refuse to yield.”). 
89 Lara Dolnik et al., supra note 85, at 277. 
90 Id. at 271, 277. 
91 Id. at 277. 
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Across all of these variables of bad information, subjects who 
heard the defendant voluntarily disclose the bad information 
consistently discounted it. They quite literally remembered it as 
being weaker and less damaging when compared with the trial in 
which the prosecution disclosed the flaw.92 In other words, the 
subjects’ minds actually changed the meaning of the bad 
information to be less harmful. This is an excellent example of Dr. 
Perloff’s observation about how the persuasive process works: 
“[p]eople persuade themselves . . . [the advocates] provide the 
arguments. They set up the bait . . . . We make the change.”93 In 
the vehicular homicide trial, the advocate simply put out the “bait” 
by volunteering harmful information and creating the 
uncomfortable feeling of dissonance. The mock jurors resolved the 
dissonance by convincing themselves that the evidence was not 
that harmful.94  
Change of meaning is largely an unconscious mental process. 
In the vehicular homicide case, it is unlikely that the mock jurors 
realized they were feeling or resolving dissonance. They may not 
even have remembered feeling uncomfortable about the 
disclosure—they simply remembered the harmful evidence as not 
so harmful.95 And once decision-makers, on their own, come to 
that belief about the evidence, it becomes their own belief. And 
                                                          
92 Id. at 283. 
93 PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 13–14. 
94 This is, of course, not the only possible response. The key to the 
dissonance (and its resolution) is the expectation of the audience that advocates 
will put forth only positive support for their cases. If the jury does not have this 
expectation, the result might be different. If, for example, people assume that the 
lawyer brought up a flaw because he is incompetent, they might have a different 
reaction. 
95 There is one key problem with extrapolating too widely from this study. 
In this study, once the defendant voluntarily disclosed the harmful evidence, that 
was the last the jury heard about it. The prosecution did not harp on the harmful 
evidence, or try to reframe it, either in cross-examination or in closing. It is an 
open question whether jurors would change meaning if, as in an actual litigation, 
one side discloses a flaw and the other side has a field day with it on cross-
examination. That more realistic scenario is the subject of a current field study. 
See Deirdre Bowen & Kathryn Stanchi, Thunder Road: Does the Timing of 
Disclosure of Bad Evidence Really Matter in Civil Trials? (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
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once embraced, viewpoints are powerful and difficult to alter.  
There are many lessons that can be drawn from these studies. 
As an initial matter, there certainly seems to be an explicit 
advantage to disclosing negative information voluntarily—and 
first. From a broader perspective, another lesson is that there are 
times when it is advantageous to put forth a less-than-perfect 
persuasive message—a more balanced approach that acknowledges 
weakness. The studies show conclusively that there is real power—
persuasive power—in acknowledging some vulnerability in your 
argument.  
 
III. AVOIDING DISSONANCE: EASING THE READER INTO 
CONTROVERSIAL OR DISPUTED PREMISES 
 
In addition to the way advocates treat flaws in their arguments, 
another key aspect of adopting a reasonable tone, and avoiding 
dissonance, is by approaching positive arguments in a subtle way.  
Arguments supporting an advocate’s position can arouse 
dissonance when they are over-argued or uncompromising. This is 
particularly dangerous for premises that are controversial, hotly 
disputed, or that have limited or no supporting authority. These 
more problematic premises are common for legal advocates to 
encounter. What legal advocates need to know is that when they 
find themselves needing to argue a controversial or hotly disputed 
premise, they are confronting a situation likely to arouse cognitive 
dissonance in their decision-maker.  
Controversial premises arouse dissonance because all decision-
makers want to act in a way that is consistent with their prior 
decisions, self-images, and egos.96 Thus, the more controversial or 
unsupported an argument is, the more dissonance it is likely to 
arouse. Conversely, an argument that has a lot of support or seems 
reasonable feels good to us in part because it avoids the discomfort 
of dissonance and arouses the positive feelings of consistency.  
Indeed, researchers remain uncertain about whether we change 
our beliefs to sustain consistency (as with our rationalizations 
about the bad, expensive show) or whether we simply observe our 
own behaviors and draw conclusions from that (i.e. the show must 
                                                          
96 See PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 248–49. 
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have been good, because I stayed until the end and I am not the 
kind of person who wastes money on bad shows). Whichever is the 
true source of our behavior-belief connection, the bottom line is 
that if an advocate presents an argument that allows the decision-
maker to feel as though he is behaving consistently with his beliefs 
and his prior decisions, the argument is more likely to be 
persuasive. On the other hand, an argument that somewhat 
abruptly asks the reader to embrace something entirely new and 
strange will be uncomfortable for the reader.97 
The difficulty here, of course, is that most advocates do not 
know the beliefs of the decision-makers in front of whom they 
argue. Would that we did! We may have some clues if we are 
appearing before a judge we know or who has previously decided 
cases similar to ours. But with jurors, we have no idea, and with 
many judges, we will have no trail that gives us a clear picture of 
the judge’s beliefs on our issue.  
But even if an advocate does not know the decision-maker’s 
beliefs, the advocate can present an argument that makes the 
decision-maker experience the good feeling of consistency and 
avoid the bad feeling of dissonance. Science suggests that if we 
organize our arguments so that our ultimate argument—the goal 
for which we are striving—appears to be the natural consequence 
of a series of arguments with which the decision-maker will agree, 
we can minimize the bad feeling of dissonance associated with a 
controversial premise and maximize that good feeling of 
consistency.98 
In other words, the advocate should slowly and methodically 
lead up to a controversial premise with “baby step” arguments with 
which the decision-maker is likely to agree. The key is to carefully 
choose the baby-step arguments that lead up to the more difficult 
premise. This approach mimics how people reason. It creates a set 
of expectations in the decision-maker such that a decision 
consistent with the argument feels good, and a decision contrary to 
the ultimate premise would trigger cognitive dissonance.  
                                                          
97 We would expect judges to place a particularly high value on 
consistency, given the value of consistency in American jurisprudence, which is 
based on stare decisis. 
98 See studies cited infra notes 101–06. 
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In one study, for example, scientists tried to get homeowners in 
a development to post on their lawns a large sign about safe 
driving.99 When, as a first step, scientists asked people to put up 
the large sign, most people declined. But the scientists were able to 
change this high rejection rate by doing one thing: they first asked 
the homeowners to do something easy—to sign a petition to “Keep 
California Beautiful.”100 Most of the homeowners agreed to sign 
the petition. And once the homeowners agreed to sign the petition, 
they were much more likely to agree to post the large sign.101 In 
other words, the homeowners were much more likely to agree to 
the big request (one that they ordinarily would have rejected) if 
they first agreed to an easier request.102 
This phenomenon is sometimes called the “foot-in-the-door” 
strategy.103 There is some disagreement about why it works. Some 
scientists believe that it works because people look at prior 
behavior to ascertain their values and beliefs; others believe it 
works because of cognitive dissonance.104 The bottom line is that 
                                                          
99 See Jonathon J. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance without 
Pressure: The Foot-in-the-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
195, 199 (1966). See also Jerry M. Burger & David F. Caldwell, The Effects of 
Monetary Incentives and Labeling on the Foot-in-the-Door Effect: Evidence for 
a Self-Perception Process, 25 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 235 (2003) 
(conducting similar experiment with a homelessness petition).  
100 Freedman & Fraser, supra note 99, at 199–201. 
101 Id. at 200–01. 
102 Id. at 201–02. 
103 Id. at 199–202. For a general discussion of foot in the door technique as 
it relates to legal persuasion, see Kathryn Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: 
An Initial Exploration, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 411, 418–20 [hereinafter 
Stanchi, Science of Persuasion].  
104 Not all psychologists agree that this process works because of cognitive 
dissonance. As Richard Perloff notes, some psychologists do not agree that 
people neurotically change their beliefs to conform to their behavior. PERLOFF, 
supra note 2, at 249. Rather, some believe that people infer or come to their 
beliefs simply by astutely observing their past decisions and behavior (I eat a lot 
of pasta and vegetables, so I must be a vegetarian). See DARYL J. BEM, BELIEFS, 
ATTITUDES, AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 50 (1970). The difference is a subtle one—
between noticing behavior and concluding that current decisions must be right 
because they are consistent with that behavior versus running from an 
inconsistent decision by changing a belief or behavior. For the purposes of 
applying the concept to legal advocacy, the subtle distinction is perhaps less 
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our decision-making grows out of our prior behavior and decisions. 
When we are asked to make a decision, our brains go through a 
fast process in which we try to determine whether we have made a 
similar decision previously and what we decided. We tend to treat 
prior decisions as a kind of precedent and make current decisions 
that are consistent with past ones. 
We will almost always seek to make a current decision that is 
consistent with our self-image, which itself is created by our past 
decisions. A high magnitude of cognitive dissonance is likely to 
result if we make a decision that is inconsistent with our prior 
decisions (and the image of ourselves that we drew from those 
prior decisions).  
For legal advocates, the key is that arguments can be structured 
so that the premise we want the decision-maker to adopt is the one 
that feels the best—avoids cognitive dissonance and feeds the 
decision-maker’s desire for consistency. Legal advocates can do 
this by breaking down the controversial premise into component 
premises that are easier to agree to—the law version of the “Keep 
California Beautiful” petition.  
By breaking down a controversial premise into components 
with which the decision-maker is likely to agree, the advocate can 
build and influence the decision-maker’s relevant cache of prior 
decisions. And, because the premises presented by the advocate are 
the most recent, they are the ones at the forefront when the 
decision-maker starts that lightning fast search of prior decisions to 
gauge, and maintain, consistency. The component arguments or 
premises should have two qualities: they must be easy for the 
decision-maker to accept, and they must be linked to the ultimate 
controversial premise. The more attractive the component 
premises, and the more closely linked to the ultimate premise, the 
harder it will be for the decision-maker to reject the ultimate 
premise.105 
A useful metaphor for this decision-making process is trying to 
                                                          
relevant, but nevertheless should be noted. Contra COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: 
PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Eddie Harmon-
Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1999); Andrew J. Elliot & Patricia G. Devine, On the 
Motivational Nature of Cognitive Dissonance: Dissonance as Psychological 
Discomfort, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 382 (1994). 
105 See generally Stanchi, Science of Persuasion, supra note 103. 
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convince a person to jump off the high dive.106 With the “foot-in-
the-door” strategy, the diver is cajoled to step up to the first step, 
then the second, then the third, and so on, until at some point it 
becomes easier and more comfortable psychologically to dive than 
to walk down all those steps. Diving is consistent with having 
agreed to step up all those steps; walking down is an 
acknowledgement that the diver was wrong to agree to take the 
early steps. Because walking down will create cognitive 
dissonance, our brains will take great steps to avoid that feeling. 
That means that the more steps we take toward the high dive, the 
more likely it is that we will dive. 
In written briefs, “foot-in-the-door” can be used to organize 
arguments in a number of ways to make controversial arguments 
less dissonant. First, it can be used on a macro level to structure 
arguments in headings or to decide the order of paragraphs within 
a heading.  Second, on a micro level, it can be used to organize 
sentences within paragraphs.  
Headings in a brief are a good macro-organizational tool to 
prime acquiescence and reduce dissonance when the reader is 
asked to agree with the disputed, controversial premise. Cruzan v. 
Missouri Dep’t of Health107 presents an excellent example of this 
tactic. Cruzan involved a highly controversial premise: whether the 
parents of a woman in a persistent vegetative state should be 
permitted to discontinue life-saving medical treatment and, 
essentially, cause their daughter to die.108 This premise is both 
legally controversial and emotionally difficult. It is likely to cause 
all kinds of cognitive dissonance.  
The petitioners, the Cruzans, lost in the Missouri Supreme 
Court and appealed to the United States Supreme Court.109 Here is 
an abridged version of the table of contents from the Petitioner’s 
brief: 
 
  
                                                          
106 This metaphor comes from G. RAY FUNKHOUSER, THE POWER OF 
PERSUASION: A GUIDE TO MOVING AHEAD IN BUSINESS AND LIFE 114 (1986). 
107 Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
108 Id. at 266–69. 
109 Id. at 265. 
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I. THE MAJORITY BELOW ERRED IN 
HOLDING THAT INCOMPETENT PERSONS 
LOSE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
WITHDRAWAL OF UNWANTED MEDICAL 
TREATMENT, AND THAT THE STATE, 
RATHER THAN THAT PERSON’S FAMILY 
SHOULD MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT 
APPROPRIATE TREATMENT 
 
A. All Persons Have A Fundamental Liberty Interest 
To Stop Unwarranted Bodily Intrusions By The 
State 
 
B. Incompetent Persons Retain Constitutional Rights 
Even Though They Cannot Now Voice Their 
Choices 
 
C. The Concept Of Family Decision-making Is 
Deeply Rooted In The Traditions Of This Country 
 
D. Missouri’s General Interest In Prolonging Life Is 
Not Sufficient To Override Nancy Cruzan’s 
Constitutional Rights To Withdrawal Of Unwanted 
Medical Treatment110 
 
Headings A, B, and C are the “foot-in-the-door” premises. 
They are axiomatic. Who would disagree that people have a right 
to avoid “bodily invasion” by the state?111 That incompetent 
people retain constitutional rights? That “family decision-making” 
is deeply embedded in our culture? Notice that cognitive 
dissonance is at work in the crafting of the component premises. 
The component premises are phrased in such a way that 
disagreement with them will arouse dissonance. The self-concept 
                                                          
110 Brief for Petitioners at II–III, Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 
261 (1990) (No. 88-1503), 1989 WL 1115261. 
111 This heading is particularly brilliant in its framing and in the vividness 
of its imagery. A case that could easily be framed as a woman’s parents trying to 
take her life is reframed into a case about state “invasion” of the woman’s bodily 
integrity. 
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of most people, perhaps particularly decision-makers, requires that 
we agree with premises that seem eminently fair, just, and non-
discriminatory—especially to particularly vulnerable people.112  
Once the reader gets to Heading D, cognitive dissonance again 
plays a role. The advocate has now convinced the decision-maker 
that A, B, and C are true and part of the decision-maker’s strongly 
held beliefs. The advocate has also linked A, B, and C to D. 
Therefore, if the decision-maker disagrees with D, dissonance is 
likely to arise. The decision-maker can avoid this dissonance by 
accepting premise D. The path to the comfortable feeling of 
consistency and consonance is diving off the metaphorical high 
dive: accept the controversial premise that has been linked to a 
bedrock of prior agreed-to decisions.   
The organization of sentences within a thesis paragraph 
presents a good example of foot-in-the-door used on a micro-
organizational level. In well-written briefs, you will often see a 
paragraph begin with a less controversial premise, or even a series 
of less controversial premises. The ultimate premise, the one on 
which the disagreement between the parties truly is based, will 
follow those less controversial premises. Consider the Petitioner’s 
brief in Atkins v. Virginia.113 In Atkins, the petitioner argued that 
imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded individuals 
violated the Eighth Amendment.114 This is another premise likely 
to cause severe dissonance. Both mental retardation115 and the 
death penalty are difficult, uncomfortable issues for many people 
to address. Adding to the problematic nature of the argument, a 
                                                          
112 PERLOFF, supra note 2, at 248 (citing Elliot Aronson, Dissonance 
Theory: Progress and Problems, in THEORIES OF COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY 5, 24 
(Robert P. Abelson et al. eds., 1968)); Claude M. Steele, The Psychology of Self-
Affirmation: Sustaining the Integrity of the Self, in 21 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 261, 270 (1988).  
113 Brief for Petitioner, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-
8452), 2001 WL 1663817. 
114 Id. at 22–40. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”). 
115 Indeed, using the term “mental retardation” in the brief was an 
interesting, and I believe, strategic choice by Atkins’ counsel. It avoided 
euphemisms like “developmentally disabled” and confronted head on our likely 
discomfort with the word “retardation” and “retarded.” 
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recent Supreme Court decision, Penry v. Lynaugh,116 had rejected 
the idea that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the 
death sentence for the mentally retarded.117 So, there was direct, 
adverse precedent. 
Counsel for Atkins began the brief, in heading A, by 
confronting the controversial premise that the mentally retarded 
categorically do not have the same level of personal culpability as 
a person of normal intellect who chooses to commit a crime.118 
This was a premise explicitly rejected by Penry just thirteen years 
before.119 But counsel does not jar the reader by starting the 
paragraph with this premise. Rather, the thesis paragraph after 
heading B eases the reader into the controversial premise. These 
sentences follow the heading in B (the numbers and parenthetical 
commentary are mine): 
1. This Court has repeatedly emphasized the 
central importance of personal culpability in 
capital sentencing. (easily accepted, this is 
Supreme Court law) 
2. The death penalty “takes as its predicate the 
existence of a fully rational, choosing 
agent.” (easily accepted) 
3. This predicate is grounded in the fundamental 
principle that “the more purposeful is the 
criminal conduct . . . the more seriously it ought 
to be punished.” (easily accepted) 
4. As a result, the death penalty is an appropriate 
punishment for those who deliberate or act with 
calculus. (easily accepted, and adds a note of 
                                                          
116 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).  
117 Penry was decided just 13 years prior to Atkins, and rejected the 
assertion that “all mentally retarded people . . . by virtue of their mental 
retardation alone, and apart from any individualized consideration of their 
personal responsibility—inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral 
capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty.” 
Id. at 338. Admittedly, Penry was decided by a divided court and represented 
something of a compromise on the execution of the mentally retarded, but it was 
nevertheless bad precedent for Atkins. 
118 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 22. 
119 Penry, 492 U.S. at 338. 
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reasonableness to the argument because it 
makes the argument two-sided) 
5. But it is a disproportionate penalty for those 
with “an immature, undeveloped ability to 
reason,” or those without the capacity to make a 
fully reasoned choice. (disputed premise of 
case)120 
With this chain, the writer has set up the decision-maker to 
accept the last and controversial premise by leading up to it with a 
series of reasonable, easily accepted premises. If you agree with 
premises 1 through 4, then premise 5 follows naturally. Notice how 
the chain makes the tone appear reasonable, moderate, and almost 
objective. The reader hears nothing controversial until that last 
premise, and by the time she gets there, that last premise seems 
hardly controversial. What the writer has done here is structure her 
argument to reduce the cognitive dissonance likely to be aroused 
by premise 5, by carefully leading the reader on a reasoning path 
that leads inexorably to its acceptance.  
Many lawyers wonder how this psychological tactic works in 
conjunction with headings. After all, the chain from the Atkins 
brief directly followed headings that asserted the controversial 
premises clearly and strongly. The heading gave the reader ample 
notice of the disputed premise and ample notice that she was going 
to be asked to jump off the high dive, which means that dissonance 
might have been aroused as soon as the decision-maker read the 
heading.121 The same issue is apparent in the Cruzan headings, 
                                                          
120 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 26–27 (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted). 
121 The chain from Atkins followed after these two headings, directly after 
A:  
I. A PROCEDURE THAT PERMITS THE DEATH 
PENALTY TO BE INFLICTED ON DEFENDANTS WITH 
MENTAL RETARDATION DESPITE THEIR DIMINISHED 
PERSONAL CULPABILITY VIOLATES THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT 
 
A. Mental retardation impairs understanding functioning in 
ways that substantially reduce personal culpability. 
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 22. 
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which start with a major heading (Roman I) that sets out the 
controversial premise.122 
This is a legitimate question. After all, the scientists in the 
“foot-in-the-door” experiments did not talk to homeowners about 
the large lawn sign before asking them about the petition.123 
Admittedly, there are many differences between asking 
homeowners about a lawn sign and trying to persuade a judge. But 
if we look at the underlying reasons why “foot-in-the-door” works, 
the differences become less important. Remember that the key to 
the “foot-in-the-door” reaction is the need for prior decisions, a 
kind of cache of precedent. This cache of prior decisions helps the 
decision-maker avoid dissonance (or helps decision-makers 
determine their belief systems, so that they can act consistently).  
The “foot-in-the-door” tactic does not ensure that advocates 
can entirely avoid decision-makers’ dissonance. To be sure, when 
the decision-maker sees the “high dive” (the controversial 
premise), she will likely experience discomfort. But the “foot-in-
the-door” strategy helps advocates alleviate or assuage decision-
makers’ dissonance. And, it helps resolve the dissonance in a 
particular direction that is favorable to the advocate.  
While it is true that the mere assertion of the controversial 
premise itself causes psychological discomfort and dissonance, the 
critical point of decision-making is usually not at the heading 
stage—in legal writing, the heading is a kind of “herald” of the 
argument to come. The heading shows the decision-maker the high 
dive, but the decision-maker has not yet been asked to dive. The 
social norms of the persuasive situation require that the decision-
maker read the arguments that follow the heading before making a 
decision; at the point of the heading, the decision-maker arguably 
still has (or should have) an open mind. So, the critical point for 
the advocate comes later, when the decision-maker has read the 
arguments and is more likely to ponder whether to agree or not 
agree with the controversial premise. At that point, the decision-
maker can either feel stronger dissonance, or she can feel the 
comfort of having made a decision that seems to be entirely 
                                                          
122 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. See also Brief for 
Petitioners, supra note 110, at II–III. 
123 Freedman & Fraser, supra note 99, at 200.  
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consistent with her prior experiences and decisions. Organizing a 
legal argument by easing the reader into the premise can make the 
reader feel those good feelings of consistency and avoid 
uncomfortable feelings of dissonance.  
Finally, what about juries? The special relationship advocates 
have with judges might suggest that easing into controversy is a 
good idea in that particular relationship. After all, judges are 
skeptical; they hear arguments all the time and are going to be 
especially sensitive to over-arguing and obvious persuasion and 
manipulation. This would make brief-writing the paradigmatic 
occasion for an argument style that eases into controversy, rather 
than one that stridently over-argues. However, the relationship 
between advocates and juries can be seen as quite different, and 
juries may have very different views about advocacy than judges. 
But lawyers also use the “foot-in-the-door” tactic to persuade 
juries to follow a controversial premise. Gerry Spence has 
described a tactic that he uses in voir dire to diffuse a common and 
strongly held prejudice that juries have against plaintiffs and 
plaintiffs’ lawyers.124 To diffuse the belief that plaintiffs are just 
trying to make money off the death of a loved one or their own 
injuries, and that plaintiffs’ lawyers are predators who chase 
ambulances, Spence constructs a series of premises that lead up to 
a controversial one. This tactic works because of “foot-in-the-
door” principles. Here is the example:  
Without me, Shirley White (my client) will have to 
face this judge and this jury alone with no one to 
speak for her . . . . Without me, there will be no one 
to stop Mr. Ketchum [the defendant’s lawyer] from 
dumping improper evidence into the case and there 
will be no one to argue the law on her behalf to his 
honor. And without me she will have to argue her 
case by herself against the likes of Mr. Ketchum, 
who is a powerful lawyer with power people behind 
him. So, Mr. Black [juror], is it all right with you if 
Shirley has chosen me to fight for her rights?125 
                                                          
124 See GERRY SPENCE, WIN YOUR CASE: HOW TO PRESENT, PERSUADE 
AND PREVAIL—EVERY PLACE, EVERY TIME 119–20 (reprt ed. 2006). 
125 Id. at 120. There are also a number of other similar strategies outlined in 
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This relatively simple emotional appeal can be deconstructed to 
reveal a series of cleverly linked arguments. What follows is my 
paraphrase of Spence’s tactic as a way of exposing the argument 
chain within the emotional appeal: 
1. Shirley White will face this judge and jury alone 
unless I am here. (Poor Shirley White!) 
2. If she is alone, no one can stop the other side 
from cheating. (Terrible! Notice also that this 
premise cleverly embeds the idea that the other 
side would try to cheat if they could.) 
3. Without a lawyer, she’ll have to face powerful 
people with no one on her side. (How unfair!) 
4. So, isn’t it ok that I am here to fight for Shirley 
White?  
The first three premises are akin to the requests of the scientists 
who asked homeowners to sign a petition before asking them to 
display a large lawn sign. Once homeowners signed that petition, 
agreement to the lawn sign on the property was much more easily 
accomplished. The same process is at work here. Once a juror 
agrees to 1, 2, and 3—and 1, 2, and 3 are cleverly designed so that 
the juror will almost certainly do so126—she will say yes to 
premise 4, or else she will be sanctioning unfairness and even 
cheating! The juror’s own self-image as a fair, caring person will 
force her to accept premise 4, at the risk of a powerful surge of 
cognitive dissonance.127  
And, perhaps most cleverly, once the juror says yes to premise 
                                                          
the chapter.  See id. at 112–27. 
126 Dissonance is also at work in the agreement to premises 1, 2, and 3. See 
Tedeschi Schlenker & Bonoma, Cognitive Dissonance: Private Ratiocination or 
Public Spectacle?, 26 AMER. PSYCHOL. 685, 690–91 (1971) (dissonance is 
aroused by a desire not to look bad in front of others). 
127 This type of persuasion is called “induced compliance.” PERLOFF, supra 
note 2 at 244–45, 253 (when an individual is induced to publicly espouse a 
position contrary to her private beliefs, and she cannot rationalize the public 
statement away, she will experience dissonance). See also Leon Festinger & 
James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J. 
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203, 209–10 (1959) (experimentally supporting 
theory that “if a person is induced to do or say something which is contrary to 
his private opinion, there will be a tendency for him to change his opinion so as 
to bring it into correspondence with what he has done or said”). 
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4, Spence can be fairly certain he can safely allow the juror to 
serve on his case without bias against the plaintiff, perhaps even 
bias in Spence’s favor. Spence has changed the cache of 
information that jurors will consult if they find themselves irritated 
by Spence’s tactics at trial, or if the bias against personal injury 
lawyers rears its head again. The jurors’ cache of personal 
“precedent” now includes a prior agreement to let Spence speak on 
behalf of Ms. White. Spence has wedged his “foot-in-the-door”—
he has gotten the juror to agree to something (in front of others), 
and the juror’s psychological need for consistency (and to avoid 
cognitive dissonance) will mean that the juror is likely to put aside 
his biases about plaintiffs’ lawyers. Indeed, the juror may even 
overcorrect in Spence’s client’s favor because the juror has 
recently, and publicly, announced that it was “all right” for Ms. 
White to have Spence as her lawyer. The momentum will be 
strongly in favor of finding for Spence’s client because of the 
dissonance that will result from the worry that a finding against 
Spence’s client would be “proof” that the juror is not, in fact, a fair 
person. Most human beings would feel embarrassed and 
uncomfortable in the face of such “proof” (the cognitive 
dissonance will be strong) and will do what they can to avoid that 
feeling. 
This example from Gerry Spence might seem to be a peculiar 
one. In some ways, particularly in its emotional manipulation, it is 
pretty heavy-handed. Spence is not known for his “light touch” in 
the courtroom—and indeed, I quoted him above as an example of a 
lawyer who sees litigation as war.128 But this gets to the heart of 
my point: whether we see litigation as a battle or not, it is how we 
do battle that matters. Spence does not go into the jury room and 
say, “You probably don’t feel good about plaintiffs’ lawyers—you 
think they are litigious and money grubbing. But that’s wrong. I’m 
not money grubbing—I’m doing this for good reasons. I’m a good 
guy, on the side of the angels! I’m the guy on the white horse. I’m 
here to help Ms. White. Mr. Ketchum is a bad man who probably 
will try to cheat, and I’m the good guy who can stop him. Don’t 
you agree that I’m the good guy here?” Not only would that not 
likely be allowed at voir dire, but it also would not be effective. 
                                                          
128 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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Our mental processes do not work that way. When an advocate 
tries to push people too hard in a particular direction, people 
usually respond negatively. Spence’s tactic does the same work, 
but more subtly. Spence is not yelling at jurors to jump off the high 
dive. Instead he eases them up each rung until they have actually 
persuaded themselves that they should dive. 
In answering the question of the better route to persuasion, 
what cognitive dissonance and “foot-in-the-door” studies tell us is 
that a technique that eases the reader step by step to the 
controversial premise will ease, or even dispel, dissonance. A 
rhetorical strategy that takes “baby steps” closely mimics an 
objective decision-maker’s reasoning process. It is subtle and 
gradual; it allows decision-makers to participate in persuading 
themselves. The advocate is less conspicuous and that makes 
decision-makers feel more autonomous. Feelings of autonomy 
avoid reactance. The advocate becomes a guide to be followed, not 
an aggressor to be fought.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Overt aggression can be tempting and satisfying for the 
advocate and her client—when you feel deeply the rightness of 
your cause, it is hard to understand how a decision-maker could 
fail to see things your way. It is very easy to think, “If I just push 
harder, more unrelentingly, maybe I can get the decision-maker to 
embrace my position.” But this ignores a fundamental truism about 
human nature—more often than not, pushing harder does not make 
the other person see our viewpoint, it makes the other person push 
back against it.  
This Article addresses two advocacy scenarios: (1) dealing 
with adverse information or arguments, and (2) introducing a 
controversial premise. At first glance, these two scenarios may 
appear to have little in common. But their commonality lies in the 
opportunities they present for the advocate to adopt a reasonable 
tone or a more aggressive one. An advocate can aggressively push 
a “too-perfect” one-sided argument, and can introduce a 
controversial premise by hammering it at the first opportunity. But 
what cognitive dissonance tells us is that in these two scenarios, 
the better approach may be for the advocate to acknowledge 
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weakness and present arguments in a way that seems more 
measured and objective. 
Part of the art of advocacy is keeping one’s eye on the goal—
and the goal is, ultimately, to convince the decision-maker of our 
position, not to pound the decision-maker on the head (as 
satisfying as that sometimes might be). And in most contexts, 
convincing others is a task that needs patience and forbearance: 
being a boxer but looking like a teacher. In other words, it requires 
advocates to walk the fine line of showing our zeal and our deep 
belief in our clients without looking like zealots. This means that 
sometimes, a tone of reasonableness and temperance is the surest 
route to the ultimate goal of convincing the decision-maker.  
 
